Red Teaming

Adversary simulation, against a real threat model.

Not a checklist. We pick a real threat actor, model how they would come after you, and rehearse the breach end to end, reaching a crown jewel and proving it, without breaking anything.

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Objective-drivenNo real damage, everDetection-gap reportUnder NDA
operator@overwatch

Case study · anonymized under NDA

One phishing pretext. Most of the company.

A finance-and-insurance group asked us to test the human layer. From a single targeted phishing campaign, one foothold opened a path to roughly four in five endpoints across the estate, no malware detonated, no customer data taken. Just proof of how far a real crew would get, and the detection gaps that let them.

op, phishing · finance/insurance
~80%

of endpoints reachable from one foothold

1

phishing pretext · zero malware

0

bytes of customer data taken

100%

mapped, reported, closed on retest

Methodology

How an engagement runs.

Every engagement is scoped to your real risk and run by hand. The shape stays the same each time, the adversary and the objective are yours.

01

Scope and threat model

We agree the adversary to emulate, the objectives worth proving, a domain controller, a production database, a source repository, an executive mailbox, the cloud management plane, and where we start: internet-only, a pre-approved phish, an assumed-breach laptop, or an insider role. We also agree who on your side knows (the white cell) and the rules of engagement.

02

Initial access

We get in the way the chosen adversary would: targeted phishing, vishing or smishing against the helpdesk, or exploitation of an exposed edge service or public-facing app, or the agreed assumed-breach start. Public-disclosure techniques only; no 0-days by default.

03

Foothold and movement

We establish a foothold and move laterally using tradecraft that matches the named adversary's known toolkit. Operator-built tooling only, never leaked commercial kits.

04

Reach the objective

We go only as far as needed to make the point: reach the crown jewel, document it, stage data inside the perimeter, or push placeholder bytes through the egress path to show a data-loss gap. Never real customer data out of the perimeter, never ransomware run at scale.

05

Debrief and report

We walk your SOC and leadership through exactly what happened, hand over the evidence and detection guidance, and confirm in writing that every implant and access path has been removed.

Hard limits, always: no denial-of-service against production, no real exfiltration of customer data, no ransomware executed beyond a single sentinel-file capability demo, and no persistence left behind once the engagement ends.

What you get

Evidence your team can act on.

description

Adversary storyboard

A narrative timeline of the operation, written for the board.

troubleshoot

Detection-gap report

Every technique your monitoring didn't catch, mapped to your SIEM.

rule

Detection rule pack

Production-grade Sigma and KQL rules, ready to deploy.

menu_book

IR playbook notes

Where your runbook held and where it didn't, prioritised.

groups

Live SOC debrief

An after-action session with the operator who ran the engagement.

verified

Implant-removal letter

Signed confirmation that all access has been removed.

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FAQ

Red teaming, answered.

How is this different from a penetration test?
A pentest is breadth-first: we enumerate a defined scope and find as many exploitable issues as we can in the time given. Red teaming is objective-first: we pick one real adversary and one crown jewel, then prove whether we can reach it, chaining apps, network, cloud, and people the way that actor actually would. A pentest tells you what's broken; a red team tells you whether your detection and response would have caught a determined attacker in motion.
Will you actually break things or steal our data?
No. The goal is to prove access, not cause damage. We reach the objective and document it, screenshots, hashes, a staged sentinel file, but we never exfiltrate real customer data, never run ransomware at scale, and never take production down. If we can demonstrate a data-loss path, we push harmless placeholder bytes through it rather than anything real. Hard limits are written into the rules of engagement before we start.
Does our blue team or SOC know in advance?
That's your call, and it changes what the exercise measures. In an assumed-breach or full-blind run, only a small "white cell" of two or three trusted people knows it's a test, so your SOC's detection and response is exercised for real. In a full-knowledge (purple team) run, defenders watch alongside us and we tune detections live. Either way, the white cell can call the engagement off at any moment.
How do you decide the objectives and crown jewels?
We agree them with you up front, based on what would actually hurt: a domain controller, a production customer database, your source repositories, an executive mailbox, the cloud management plane, or a specific business transaction. We also agree the starting position, internet-only, a pre-approved phish, or an assumed-breach laptop. Reaching the objective is the pass/fail line; everything we do maps back to it.
How long does a red team engagement take?
More than a pentest, typically three to six weeks of active operation, because realistic tradecraft means moving slowly enough to stay under the radar. You get a firm window after the scoping call, plus the debrief and detection-gap report afterwards. Shorter assumed-breach scenarios that skip the initial-access phase can run in two.
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